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AGAINST SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION: 
A TREATMENT FOR MCCONVILL’S 
PSYCHONOMICOSIS 
Harry G. Hutchison* & R. Sean Alley** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A current debate in corporate law and governance concerns how power 
should be allocated among directors, shareholders and management. 
Proposals to strengthen the power of shareholders include an American Bar 
Association proposal to amend the Model Business Corporation Act to 
require a majority vote for the election of directors,1 a recent congressional 
initiative mandating advisory shareholder votes on executive pay plans2 and 
Lucian Bebchuk’s effort to vindicate undistorted shareholder choice in a 
takeover context.3 Additionally, 
[t]he Delaware General Assembly has recently adopted an amendment to 
the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that where 
shareholders have adopted a majority voting bylaw for corporate elections 
over the traditional plurality scheme, a corporation may not subsequently 
amend its bylaws to return to plurality voting without shareholder 
approval.4 
While these initiatives may have little positive impact on stock prices,5 
various efforts to strengthen shareholders’ power at the expense of insiders 
have gained wider support in the wake of Enron, WorldCom and the 
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 1. See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, Corporate Laws Committee Releases Preliminary 
Report on Director Voting (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/20060117000000.pdf. 
 2. Rachel McTague, Frank Urges Advisory Shareholder Vote on CEO Pay Gives Alternative 
to Divestiture, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 377 (Mar. 12, 2007). 
 3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 973 (2002) (explaining an undistorted shareholder choice approach to corporate 
takeovers). 
 4. John Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? The Majority Voting 
Amendment to  Delaware Corporate Law 1 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 2015, 
2007), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/2015. 
 5. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of 
Directors (Feb. 24, 2007) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962784 
(offering an empirical study of market reaction to the adoption by firms of a majority voting 
requirement for the election of directors and showing that, at least when shareholders lack veto 
authority over candidates, these so-called reforms amount to little more than “smoke and 
mirrors”). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act.6 Given this environment and despite evidence that 
verifies stronger corporate governance rules do not “unambiguously show 
that corporate governance reduces the agency problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection,”7 much academic commentary supports such 
shareholder-empowering governance initiatives.8 This is despite the 
probability that most (but not all)9 initiatives ignore evidence showing that 
separation of ownership and control justifies the current regime of limited 
shareholder voting rights and director control as the default rule.10 
Notwithstanding the blizzard of proposals aimed at strengthening 
shareholder power, it is widely recognized that neither the notion of 
shareholder ownership nor the assertion that stockholders are risk-bearing 
residual claimants provides a convincing ground for shareholder primacy.11 
“Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to 
disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable: 
namely, the centralization of essentially non-reviewable decisionmaking 
authority in the board of directors.”12 The business judgment rule rightly 
effects a compromise between two competing values: authority and 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of 
Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2006). 
 7. Valentina G. Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There 
Be Too Much of a Good Thing? 9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 
142/2007, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=956329. The authors further note that 
agency cost problems “can arise from reverse causality, that is, companies [may] improve their 
corporate governance practices . . . [as a commitment device] when raising new funds.” Or 
alternatively they become more dependent on external financing, which may “trigger changes in 
[the] companies’ corporate governance structures, in part . . . [because investors] require [such] 
changes.” Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 835, 847–50 (2005) (raising a number of proposals that might increase the power of 
shareholders). But see, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 622–24 (2006) (pointing out the mechanical difficulties of achieving 
consensus among thousands of shareholders impede their active role). See also Henry Hansmann 
& Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) 
(“Chief among [the] pressures [for convergence in governance practices] is the recent dominance 
of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law . . . . It is only a matter of time before its 
influence is felt in the reform of corporate law as well.”). 
 9. For an innovative reform proposal that might maintain directors’ discretion in light of the 
separation of ownership and control, but which might also help more properly align directorial 
oversight, see Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors (Harvard John 
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 578, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=959210. 
 10. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006). 
 11. Antoine Rebérioux, Shareholder Primacy and Managerial Accountability 1–2 
(Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 01, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=961290 (suggesting, among other things, that “when contracts are 
incomplete, non-shareholder constituencies—and in particular workers investing in specific 
human capital—do bear risk”). 
 12. Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1749. 
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accountability.13 This compromise favors the director primacy model as the 
best explanation of authority and disfavors (but does not necessarily 
eliminate) accountability of shareholders. This suggests that contemporary 
shareholder-empowerment initiatives unwisely endeavor to vindicate 
accountability fears at the expense of necessary authority. 
Some corporate governance proposals aimed at enhancing shareholder 
participation appear to reflect discontent with traditional economics on the 
one hand and an apparent embrace of the emerging literature on happiness 
on the other.14 “Whereas economics assumes that people’s choices advance 
their well-being, the happiness literature suggests that, in many settings 
people make poor choices that undermine their happiness or subjective 
well-being.”15 Corporate law scholar James McConvill emphasizes that this 
emerging focus on happiness is simply a form of psychonomics.16 
McConvill supplies analysis that appears to substantiate the happiness 
literature’s critique of traditional economic assumptions that inform typical 
corporate governance debates. His analysis serves to advance an ongoing 
effort to empower shareholders and diminish the power of directors. Instead 
of concentrating on economic return, McConvill proposes shareholder 
participation as a happiness-realization vehicle in order to create a new 
approach to corporate governance. 
Far from endorsing the existing state of affairs, McConvill proposes a 
novel corporate governance approach that issues forth as an endless process 
of participation and self-discovery that forms a new normality: shareholder 
empowerment as end in itself.17 While the satisfaction of selfish motives 
remains an unruffled objective, material gain as a maxim is exchanged for 
participatory experience. He disputes the judgment that “[a] business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end.”18 
In the traditional corporate model, shareholders have little room to 
originate action or participate in corporate decisionmaking. McConvill 
contests customary conceptions of rational choice analysis for 
shareholders,19 and argues, “the perceived logic which encapsulates rational 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 85–87 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule is designed to effect a 
compromise between two competing values: authority and accountability). 
 14. Mathew D. Adler & Eric Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis 1 (Univ. 
of Pa. Law Sch., Scholarship at Penn Law Paper No. 167, 2007) available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/167 (providing background on happiness literature and 
cost-benefit analysis). 
 15. Id. 
 16. James McConvill, Shareholder Empowerment As an End in Itself: A New Perspective on 
Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013, 1039–43 (2007). 
 17. Id. at 1015. 
 18. See id. at 1028 (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)). 
 19. Id. at 1057–59. 
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choice theory fails to appreciate the non-financial benefits that can be 
derived from increasing shareholder power.”20 McConvill’s fresh look 
requires explication and a critique. 
In Part II, this article supplies comments regarding the authors’ under-
standing of economics. It then discusses economics’ limitations in 
explaining human behavior, and outlines the prevailing terms of the 
corporate governance debate. Part III supplies a general critique of 
McConvill’s analysis. This Part examines McConvill’s failure to provide 
empirical research that sustains his claim that shareholder empowerment is 
a necessary ideal.21 This Part also examines the costs of increased 
shareholder participation, including the costs incurred in initiating and 
implementing changes to the current system and the related implications for 
corporate performance. The evidence destabilizes McConvill’s contention 
that increased shareholder participation can ever be a cost-free good. The 
analysis concludes that social happiness through participation is an 
optimizing problem, not a maximizing problem, so that more participation 
is not necessarily better. This article is the first of a series of articles22 
offering critical analysis to vitiate McConvill’s Panglossian conclusions. 
II. EXAMINING THE BACKGROUND AND MCCONVILL’S 
PARADIGM 
A. BACKGROUND: PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
1. The Economic Cases For and Against Shareholder Passivity 
and Separation of Ownership and Control 
In order to grapple with the ideas and currents that ripple through 
McConvill’s essay, it is helpful to appreciate that his article echoes an 
emerging tension between active shareholder participation and passivity. 
Traditional economics and cost-benefit analysis makes a case for 
shareholder passivity in the face of organizational and transactional 
complexity. Most scholars, since “the days of Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means . . . have understood that in public corporations, shareholder 
‘ownership’ does not mean shareholder control.”23 McConvill observes that 
separation of ownership and control “naturally developed through the 
simultaneous evolution of control in the hands of professional directors and 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 1057. 
 21. Instead of empirical evidence linked to shareholders, McConvill provides implicit 
analogies in the form of studies about participatory activities and their effects on human 
happiness. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 22. See, e.g., R. Sean Alley & Harry G. Hutchison, The High Costs of Shareholder 
Participation (Nov. 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 23. Lynn Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence On Why Investors in 
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 667–78 (2003). 
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diminished [the] status of ownership, resulting from control being removed 
as one of the characterizing features of property.”24 This trend was 
accelerated by the dispersion of ownership—the absence of a single 
shareholder with a large enough stake to exercise control—and 
accompanied by managers holding only a small stake in the enterprise.25 
McConvill asserts that the position of shareholders has changed from an 
active to a passive role and shares of stock have become simple pieces of 
paper that contain certain financial expectations but provide little or no 
control over the physical property and the instruments of production of the 
enterprise.26 The shares represent a financial interest in the affairs of the 
corporation while allowing the firm’s directors and executives to get on 
with managing the firm.27 Shareholders operate within a framework 
characterized by bounded rationality and complexity, are widely dispersed, 
have different time horizons and have difficulty reaching collective 
decisions.28 Thus, typical corporate law scholarship implies that 
shareholders are rationally apathetic,29 because they lack both the interest 
and the incentive to “devote much time to, or to acquire significant 
expertise in, the firm’s affairs.”30 Evidently shareholders, aware of their 
own opportunity costs, decide not to trade their time for more corporate 
participation. They primarily desire material well-being, which directors, as 
platonic guardians, seek to maximize.31 
                                                                                                                 
 24. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1019. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1020 (quoting ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 116 (rev. ed., 1967) (1932)). 
 27. See id. at 1021. 
 28. Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting 
Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 1201 
(2005). 
 29. See Stout, supra note 23, at 673. 
The typical public firm has thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders. 
How can these individuals reach a collective decision? Shareholder voting is slow, 
difficult and expensive, even with modern information technology. In contrast, a board 
of ten or twelve members can meet and vote on these issues relatively quickly, easily 
and cheaply. . . . Director voting offers other important advantages over shareholder 
voting as well. In the typical public firm, ownership is widely dispersed, with most 
investors holding only a relatively small portion of the firm’s outstanding shares. As a 
result, few shareholders have the incentive to devote much time to, or to acquire 
significant expertise in, the firm’s affairs. 
Id. See also Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 622–24 (pointing out the mechanical difficulties of 
achieving consensus among thousands of shareholder impede their active role). 
 30. Stout, supra note 23, at 673; see also Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1201 (“The capability of 
shareholders (as a disparate group) to manage relatively large corporations is hindered by 
collective action problems tied to disparate preferences, different persuasive abilities, different 
time horizons, as well as differing capacities to digest pertinent financial, microeconomic and 
macroeconomic information even when widely available.”). 
 31. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003). 
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America’s leading corporate jurisdiction has adopted a particular 
solution to accommodate separation of ownership and control. Delaware’s 
General Corporation Law is grounded in the conclusion that “it is not 
feasible for shareholders, the owners of the corporation, to exercise day-to-
day power over the company’s business and affairs.”32 Although this 
version of shareholder primacy, coupled with management by directors, 
may be rooted in what Rebérioux calls the “philosophy of dispossession,”33 
one might argue that “boards can . . . retain power pursuant [to] a . . . 
corporate governance approach that allows contracting parties to agree in 
advance via the corporate charter to allow the board to entrench itself.”34 
Thus understood, shareholders engage in a form of private ordering called 
“precommitment,” where they bind themselves “ex ante, . . . to improve 
their collective position ex post.”35 However, board “[e]mpowerment has a 
cost—it risks entrenchment and self-interested behavior, which may reduce 
shareholder wealth. Hence, courts and shareholders are properly concerned 
about accountability.”36 
But accountability concerns alone cannot serve as the basis to empower 
shareholders. While it is possible that the director-primacy model risks 
increased agency costs37 in exchange for more managerial freedom of 
initiative, leading to superior corporate performance,38 the shareholder-
primacy model, if viable, contributes to ex post and ex ante inefficiencies.39 
Stephen Bainbridge shows that the director primacy-based system of 
corporate governance, as explained by the model of rational choice, has 
served investors and society well.40 “[T]his record of success has occurred 
not in spite of the separation of ownership and control, but because of that 
separation.”41 Limited shareholder power is consistent with an accurate 
                                                                                                                 
 32. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *25. (The Supreme Court of 
Delaware accepts the conclusion that shareholders are both the true owners and the true principals 
of the firm). But see Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1196–200 (disagreeing with this move because it 
delimits beneficial risk-taking by the board of directors). 
 33. Rebérioux, supra note 11, at 5 (“This situation has led to an exclusive focus on the 
question of control: how can the lost power be recovered?”); see also Hutchison, supra note 28, at 
1175 (discussing the interplay between Unocal and Blasius and criticizing the validation of voting 
rights independent of the shareholders’ contract rights because that might incorrectly imply 
stockholder control and shareholder-based authority as the null hypothesis). 
 34. Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1114. 
 35. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Precommitment and Managerial Incentives: Corporate 
Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
522 (2003). 
 36. Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1201. 
 37. Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1189, 1200 (2002). 
 38. See, e.g., Bruno & Claessens, supra note 7, at 6–7, 39–46 (providing empirical evidence 
on a cross-country basis indicating that optimal corporate governance does not imply either 
greater regulation or greater accountability). 
 39. See Stout, supra note 37, at 1200–01. 
 40. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 636. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
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description of how corporations work,42 as well as the necessity of 
constraining accountability in order to preserve authority.43 
This contractarian model is not without its critics. One scholar implies 
the contractarian model is deficient because it is based largely on the 
perfect-market assumption.44 However, though the market may be imperfect 
and contract theory not flawless, similar or worse imperfections plague 
other theories of corporate governance without responding adequately to the 
authority-versus-accountability conflict. Contractarianism is grounded in 
the conclusion that individual preferences lead to decisions that denote the 
perceived preferences of the organizers and investors within the firm. 
Contractarian analysis is informed by the director primacy model and 
embraces shareholder weakness.45 In spite of the problems, and critics such 
as Alchian and Demsetz,46 most commentators remain contractarians,47 
animated by the belief in the necessity of fiat.48 
Economic assumptions are embedded in the separation of ownership 
and control paradigm. Tension surfaces because law and economics, as a 
general rule, tend to produce distributive results that are not universally 
agreed upon. Typical corporate governance models operate as forms of 
private ordering that require hierarchs to make decisions. When directors 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1735. 
 43. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974). 
 44. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 779, 781 (2006); see also Giulio Palermo, Misconceptions of Power: From Alchian and 
Demsetz to Bowles and Gintis (Univ. of Brescia, Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper 05/10, 2005), 
available at http://www.unibs.it/on-line/dse/Home/Inevidenza/PaperdelDipartimento/ 
articolo3483.html. 
 45. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1735. 
 46. Alchian and Demsetz’s property rights approach denies the existence of authority. For a 
summary, see Palermo, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2–4; see also Armen A. 
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 
AMER. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by 
authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional market. 
This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no 
authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary 
market contracting between any two people. 
Id. at 777. But see Oliver Williamson, Efficiency, Power, Authority and Economic Organization, 
in TRANSACTION COSTS ECONOMICS AND BEYOND 33 (John Groenewegen, ed., 1996) 
(suggesting that Alchian and Demsetz are wrong: “firms can and do exercise fiat that markets 
cannot”). 
 47. We accept this description for purposes of corporate governance, but we do not necessarily 
accept, for example, the external derivation of ideals that culminates in John Rawls 
contractarianism. For an accessible discussion of these issues see NICHOLAS L. 
GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: BASIC TOOLS FOR 
NORMATIVE REASONING 25–27 (2005). 
 48. See, e g., William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (acknowledging that contractarianism is the “dominant legal 
academic view”); see also, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder 
Debate, 4 VILL. J. L. & INVESTMENT MGMT. 3, 13 (2002). 
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make decisions that ostensibly benefit the firm and create shareholder 
wealth, they engage in trade-offs that are protected by the business 
judgment rule. However, corporate managers and the board often discover 
their interests are not completely aligned with shareholders’, which raises 
the specter of agency costs.49 This development is accompanied presumably 
by unfair distributions, undemocratic decision-making and inadequate 
control by capital holders. Thus, many observers challenge those economic 
assumptions underlying the customary default rule of director 
empowerment. 
2. The Difficulty of Using Pure Economics to Explain Human 
Behavior 
Uncertainties coupled with introspective and public dissatisfaction, 
have risen to prominence ever since Americans discovered that democracy 
and radical human autonomy yield less than they promised. Critics of the 
existing social and economic order, driven by social psychology or 
otherwise, seek non-market solutions or advance proposals that are 
disconnected with the price system in an effort to change the existing order. 
This move appears to be grounded in the inability of standard economics 
and market forces to justify a human life that appears, for all its 
contemporary advantages, nasty, brutish, unfair and beyond the control of 
individuals and, thus, without meaning. In other words, shareholders, like 
other partly rational human agents, lead incompletely explained and 
unfulfilled lives that conform to Aldous Huxley’s perdurable perception of 
modern humanity.50 An individual’s sense of despair and unfairness and her 
craving for alternative doors of perception may correlate inversely with her 
sense of freedom.51 Since an individual’s sense of freedom and the 
definition of freedom itself are apt to vary across the population, the 
resultant disenchantment reflects the inability of any existing approach to 
solve all problems or justify the current allocations of resources and the 
current ends of economic institutions on terms that all will endorse. 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Stout, supra note 37, at 1200. 
 50. ALDOUS HUXLEY, THE DOORS OF PERCEPTION 62 (Harper & Row 1970) (1954) (“Most 
men and women lead lives at the worst so painful, at the best so monotonous, poor and limited 
that the urge to escape, the longing to transcend themselves if only for a few moments, is and has 
always been one of the principal appetites of the soul.”). 
 51. Sebastiano Bavetta et al., Autonomy Freedom and Preferences for Redistribution 2–3 (Jan. 
23, 2007) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958948. 
People who enjoy autonomy have, to a large extent, control over their achievements so, 
what they perceive as fair or unfair is likely to depend upon the degree of autonomy 
they enjoy. . . . [Thus] the higher is the extent of autonomy freedom perceived by an 
individual, the higher is the probability that he supports the view that larger income 
differences are needed as incentives for individual effort. 
Id. 
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On one hand, classical economics implies that humans can be defined 
and human capability can be measured by the concept of rationality.52 
Rationality presupposes the capacity of individual choice.53 On the other 
hand, notions of revealed preferences and rational utility maximization 
materialize potentially as an empty suit. The distributional consequences 
and the dissatisfying implications for human life in a postmodern age, 
where individuals are unable to experience the happiness that material 
goods and consumption once fostered, are troubling. The foundational 
notion of rational economic man and its implied norm, “wealth 
maximization,” have come under attack. This assault persists despite the 
fact that rational choice implicates the fulfillment of both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary wants.54 
On one account, “[e]conomics can be distinguished from other social 
sciences by the belief that most . . . behavior can be explained by assuming 
that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices 
consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear.”55 
Additionally, “[e]conomics has assumed that all men pursue their private 
interest[s].”56 That is to say, they aim to maximize something, but what that 
something is, is debatable.57 The field of law and economics frequently 
explains outcomes via wealth maximization rather than social welfare 
maximization.58 Others endeavor to diminish contractarian explanations of 
corporate law by invoking trust.59 Intuitively, trust with its moral 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Sandra J. Peart & David M. Levy, Attitudes Towards Race, Hierarchy and Transformation 
in the 19th Century, 47 HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 15, 18 (2005). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Bruce E. Kaufman, Expanding the Behavioral Foundations of Labor Economics, 52 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 361, 363 (1999). 
 55. Id. at 364. 
 56. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (1989). 
 57. Adam Smith may be the source of this debate. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF 
MORAL SENTIMENTS 1 (Dover Publications, Inc. 2006) (1759) (“However selfish soever man may 
be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of 
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the 
pleasure of seeing it.”). 
 58. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12879, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12879 (suggesting 
that the focus on the maximization of wealth rather than social welfare is driven by the conclusion 
that the distributional issues that bear on social welfare can be best addressed through the tax 
system). As an elementary matter of course, 
[t]he idea of a social welfare function is part of normative economics . . . [beginning] 
with the fundamental idea of utility as a conception or measure of the good. Economists 
may disagree about the nature of utility, the relationship of utility to social welfare, and 
the role of welfare in public policy, but most (if not all) economists would assent to the 
abstract proposition that ceteris paribus more utility is a good thing. 
Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/ (last visited Nov. 
19, 2007). 
 59. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
595 (1997).  
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underpinnings, provides non-pecuniary benefits and implicates richer 
normative values than monetary wealth-maximization.60 
Disappointed perhaps by the debate over ordinal or cardinal utility61 as 
well as the non-interpersonal comparability of such measures commentators 
conclude, “An important step in expanding the traditional analysis of 
individual rational choice is to incorporate into the theory a much richer 
class of attitudes, preferences, and calculations.”62 Dissatisfaction with the 
notion of revealed preference and rational utility maximization is grounded 
in the premise that people often do not know what is in their interest.63 This 
development is related to the concepts of bounded rationality, bounded 
willpower and bounded self-interest.64 Bounded rationality reflects the 
limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem-solving. Bounded 
willpower captures the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not 
in their long-run interest. Bounded self-interest incorporates the fact that 
humans are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others.65 
Human irrationality thus presents an epistemological challenge to any 
pretensions of normative economic analysis,66 including existing 
shareholder-participation rights. 
While such critiques of normative economic analysis are valid, attempts 
to undermine the notion of the rational decision-maker must tackle an 
endogenicity problem: Unless they come from a different gene pool than 
the rest of us, the architects of such critiques face the risk that their analysis 
is tainted by their own irrationality.67 Furthermore, while economics has 
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much to say about social welfare in a broad sense, it cannot explain all of 
life. Although some commentators imply that human self-interest can be 
explained simply as avaricious greed or monetary self-interest,68 a more 
complete description of human rationality should admit a wider array of 
explanations for the choices humans make. Simple material gain supplies 
only “one of many motives propelling economic [and other] activity.”69 It 
seems that “a richer appreciation of self-interest helps to explain human 
behavior in the contemporary world.”70 Still, the controversy concerning the 
source and consequences of individual choice persists. 
B. MCCONVILL’S CLAIMS 
1. Shareholder Participation As The New Goal 
In response to this controversy, new or hybrid fields have developed to 
fill perceived epistemic voids in the study of the distribution of goods and 
the provision of human welfare. These developments have led to social 
psychology, which in combination with economics, morphs into behavioral 
economics71 or psychonomics. Commentators have expressed concern 
about the absence of active participation. Some have insisted that citizens 
must not be mere passive beneficiaries, but instead must be active 
participants in the control process.72 The theory proceeds as follows: 
diminished participation leads to diminished happiness. In his effort to fill 
the perceived “happiness” void in western societies,73 McConvill offers a 
rather open-ended form of shareholder participation as a fulfillment device. 
The two most important institutions in America’s politico-economic 
system, democracy and the market, make individual preferences decisive in 
the formation of policy and the allocation of resources.74 In corporate law 
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and prevailing modes of corporate governance, individual choice is 
reflected in contractarianism.75 Typically, in large, publicly traded firms, the 
preferences that, under the contractarian model, drive corporate 
decisionmaking76 yield governance structures where directors and 
managers, assisted by the business judgment rule,77 direct and participate. 
Shareholders rarely initiate activity. There is a limited role for shareholders 
in ensuring that “corporate decisions are unbiased, informed, established in 
good faith, [and] made in the[ir] best interest.”78 This limited role is 
vindicated by shareholder ability to file derivative actions to redress alleged 
corporate injuries for breach of fiduciary duties.79 
However, this limited role prompts dissatisfaction.80 Commentators 
thus have engaged in a pressing search for alternative conceptions of 
corporate governance that would justify a more robust role for shareholders. 
This search has led to a “series of recent initiatives in the United States to 
increase the participatory rights, and hence the power, of shareholders,”81 
including McConvill’s proposal.82 
On one level McConvill appears to be a contractarian who accepts the 
possibility that the existing default rules may accord with the preferences of 
shareholders.83 On another, he is dissatisfied with the customary outcome of 
this contractual exchange. He accepts the claim that greater personal 
happiness comes “when participating with other[s] . . . to build . . . 
                                                                                                                 
preferences, or that elected representatives behave in a way that will maximize their 
chances for re-election or for some other enhancement of their position. 
Id. at 4–5. 
 75. See supra Part II.A.1 for a brief discussion of contractarianism. 
 76. Id. 
 77. One argument in favor of the business judgment rule is that in its absence, “officers and 
directors would fail to make the risk-neutral business decisions desired by investors who can limit 
their overall investment risk through diversification.” Jolls, supra note 58, at 27. 
 78. Harry G. Hutchison, Presumptive Business Judgment, Substantive Good Faith, Litigation 
Control: Vindicating the Socioeconomic Meaning of Harhen v. Brown, 26 J. CORP. L. 285, 286 
(2001). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., scholars cited infra note 82. 
 81. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1013. 
 82. Other articles that advocate greater shareholder empowerment include Lucian Bebchuk, 
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 8; Bebchuk, supra note 3 (asserting that 
once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured by requiring the hostile bidder to win a shareholder 
vote, boards should not have a veto over takeover bids); Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV & 
Guhan Subramanian, The Anti-Takeover Power of Classified Boards: Theory, Evidence and 
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (the combination of poison pills and a staggered board that 
exists in a majority of publicly traded firms acts as a powerful anti-takeover device requiring 
correction in the form of shareholder empowerment). But see Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism 
About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006) (challenging the claim 
of shareholder primacists that reapportioning corporate governance power away from boards of 
directors and toward shareholders will benefit shareholders as a class). 
 83. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1062 (suggesting that shareholders could change the terms of 
the contract). 
2007] Against Shareholder Participation 53 
‘relational goods’,”84 and contends that the pursuit of happiness is the 
ultimate objective of human beings.85 Thus, participation rather than 
passivity is the rational choice for shareholders.86 He emphasizes that 
shareholders, in addition to purchasing a risk-adjusted economic return for 
their capital investment, should have the right to participate in the firm’s 
governance and decision-making if they so wish. Dividing shareholder 
purchases into categories of material and experiential goods, participation 
rights become an experiential purchase leading to relational goods that 
augment the happiness and welfare of shareholders.87 Consequently, 
shareholder participation ought to become an end in itself. 
McConvill’s paradigm asserts the right for shareholders to demand (and 
the obligation of corporations to accommodate) participation, wherein 
shareholders achieve enhanced happiness benefits in combination with 
undiminished material gains. He posits a floating nodal point of synthesis88 
between director and shareholder primacy. Theoretically, his proposal 
would allow ultimate control to remain in the hands of directors/managers 
as opposed to shareholders. But the centripetal tendency of his approach 
necessarily shrinks directorial control and insists on shareholder 
participation as the new ordering principle. 
McConvill’s model can be depicted by the following: Participation 
requires the interaction of others and happiness varies with the level of this 
interaction.89 
Even if active involvement in the corporation seems less desirable at the 
time [of purchase] than sitting back and collecting the dividend check, 
empirical findings . . . show that when looking back on the decision, 
shareholders, even in the largest of corporations, are likely to be happier 
by following the participation path.90 
McConvill further contends that relational goods like investor 
participation can be purchased without any costs to either shareholders or 
the firm.91 Hence, economic returns to the firm remain unaffected. 
McConvill emphasizes the argument that the value of participation has been 
either inappropriately or incompletely addressed.92 He suggests that applied 
psychonomics favors shareholder participation.93 Within the corporate 
governance debate, psychonomics theoretically reflects the disavowal of 
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individual preferences (narrowly described) in collective determination and 
the prescription of the appropriate governance regime. This rejection is 
premised on an imaginative conception that human cravings underlie 
psychological accounts of human wants. Whichever studies are used, 
psychonomics and happiness studies94 imply that shareholders ought to 
enjoy greater, longer-lasting happiness by using their shares to create a 
participatory role in the corporation.95 Eschewing the rational-choice model 
of the human agent, McConvill contests the conclusion that shareholders 
are rationally apathetic and introduces greater psychological complexity 
into the model of the human agent.96 He concludes that “happiness theory” 
and psychonomics together imply that neither shareholder wealth 
maximization nor the protection of stakeholders’ interest(s) ought to occupy 
the high ground in debates about corporate governance.97 
While we agree that Enlightenment progress98 can be illusory, this 
critique of human rationality is of a piece with Professor Gedicks’ 
observation that contemporary attempts to overcome post-Enlightenment 
gloom reflect the postmodern conclusion that our world has fallen apart and 
that we live at the end of the neoclassical age as society struggles through 
the aftermath of confusion and helplessness wherein the real world, 
including the world of economics, lacks reality.99 Manifestly influenced by 
this intuition, McConvill emphasizes this paradoxical claim: Society should 
move away from the self-referential world of economics and embrace a 
different kind of rationality that is even more enlightened and more 
considered as the axiomatic forces of neoclassicalism are placed on the 
run.100 He offers a “new” paradigm of rationality. “Rather than a decision 
being rational because an economist thinks it is, a decision is rational 
because it is in [the] best interests of the decision-maker.”101 This fuels an 
inescapable question: Who ought to be the appropriate decision-maker—the 
shareholders or McConvill and the other members of the psychonomical 
community? 
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2. McConvill as a Possible Third Option in the Shareholder 
Primacy/Director Primacy Debate? 
If one can refrain from concluding that McConvill’s theory is fatally 
counterintuitive and lacks persuasive evidence, one notes that many 
corporate law scholars are animated either by shareholder-primacy norms102 
or by director-primacy reality.103 Assuming the soundness of McConvill’s 
proposal, it may provide a “third way” forward by specifying a model that 
simultaneously achieves wealth maximization and provides an independent 
nonmaterial source of shareholder happiness. 
Leading shareholder primacists concede the possibility, but reject the 
defensibility, of the “third way.” Bebchuk states: “Some supporters of 
shareholder access have ‘shareholder voice’ and ‘corporate democracy’ as 
objectives. But the case for shareholder access does not depend on having 
such objectives.”104 Instead, he concentrates “on the sole objective of 
effective corporate governance that enhances corporate value.”105 Implicit 
in Bebchuk’s approach is the affirmation that providing space for more 
robust shareholder activity and decision-making leads to value-enhancing 
corporate behavior.106 In contrast, Bainbridge’s director-primacy framework 
separates accountability from authority and contends that shareholders 
have, and ought to have, a very limited role in corporate governance and 
concludes that shareholder empowerment fails to offer the benefit of 
improved corporate performance.107 Both Bebchuk’s and Bainbridge’s 
approaches provide testable hypotheses. Nevertheless, McConvill contests 
both claims by maintaining that shareholder participation can be 
accommodated “without unduly interfering with the traditional default rule 
of managerial authority [which is] the best guarantee of corporate 
performance.”108 He insists that any allegation that shareholders are 
rationally apathetic, and therefore, that shareholder empowerment is not 
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warranted, is an “intellectually lazy argument” because it rests on a simple, 
overly narrow assumption that shareholders are interested primarily in 
wealth maximization.109 
III. A GENERAL CRITIQUE 
There are a number of problems with McConvill’s analysis. He avoids 
presenting any empirical evidence that substantiates the claim that 
shareholder empowerment is necessary, and refuses to deal with 
shareholders as they are—a disparate group with often inharmonious and 
incommensurable interests. He also fails to provide a convincing theory that 
delineates how material goods can be transformed into experiential ones. 
Hence, the debate is grounded in cloudy, if not conflicting, terms. 
McConvill also ignores the costs of shareholder participation, including 
coordination cost as well as the cost resulting from the search for private 
benefits. 
A. THE ABSENCE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
McConvill presents more than twenty studies as references. However, 
none of the studies deal directly with whether shareholders desire 
McConvill’s preferred outcome of shareholder participation. He does 
provide information derived from Tim Kasser’s book, The High Price of 
Materialism;110 Bruni & Stanca’s study examining human acquisition of 
relational goods as opposed to watching television;111 investigations derived 
from brain scans recording how certain events or sensations impact the 
parts of the brain that generate happiness or sorrow;112 and discussions of 
positive psychology and the law, which suggest that a high degree of 
liberty, allowing individuals to pursue individual goals, is important for 
enabling individuals to pursue happiness.113 While these studies provide 
descriptions of what makes people happy in general terms, they are entirely 
without any direct connection to shareholders as a group and the allocation-
of-corporate power debate in particular. None of the studies show why 
providing participatory activities within a corporate governance context is 
essential. The evidence presented fails to support a defensible prescription 
for the allocation of power debate that favors shareholder empowerment. 
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B. SHAREHOLDERS ARE A DISPARATE GROUP 
Even if one finds evidence that shows that retail, institutional, short-
term and long-term shareholders are captivated by the compulsion to 
participate, however, it is likely that some shareholders will view 
participation in different ways than others. This exposes McConvill’s 
paradigm to interest divergence. Shareholders committed to happiness may 
have differing definitions of what happiness means for them, as well as 
differing ideas about how much and what type of participation is required in 
order to generate the happiness they seek. Participation by individual or 
institutional shareholders who are animated by divergent interests may have 
adverse implications for the community of shareholders. McConvill (like 
many shareholder primacists), ignores this fact and presumes that 
reapportioning corporate governance power away from boards of directors 
and toward shareholders will benefit shareholders as a class.114 
Most shareholder primacists “contend that shareholders would like 
managers to maximize the long-term value of their shares, but that 
managers are unlikely to do so because their interests are insufficiently 
aligned with those of shareholders.”115 Solving this agency-cost problem 
requires increasing shareholder power116 with the objective of maximizing 
shareholder value in some largely material sense.117 McConvill supports 
shareholder empowerment, but not as a solution to the agency-cost 
question. In contrast to typical shareholder primacists, McConvill 
concentrates on shareholder empowerment for a different purpose: 
maximization of life experiences. Expanding shareholder power solves a 
different problem—the happiness void in western societies118—by 
providing necessary relational goods for shareholders. But his program 
suffers from the same error as that of other shareholder primacists’: They 
all119 underplay “deep rifts among the interests of large blockholders, those 
shareholders most likely to exercise shareholder power.”120 He also ignores 
differences between institutional and individual shareholders. 
In addition, McConvill and other shareholder primacists refuse to 
recognize their theory’s ignorance of interest divergence. The “case for 
increasing shareholder power assumes that shareholders would overcome 
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collective action problems to make use of the power being transferred to 
them.”121 Stephen Bainbridge clarifies: 
All organizations must have some mechanism for aggregating the 
preferences of the organization’s constituencies and converting them into 
collective decisions. As Professor Kenneth Arrow explains such 
mechanisms fall out on a spectrum between “consensus” and “authority.” 
Authority-based decisionmaking structures, which are characterized by a 
central agency empowered to make decisions binding on the firm as a 
whole, tend to arise when the firm’s constituencies face information 
asymmetries and have differing interests. Because the corporation 
demonstrably satisfies those conditions, vesting the power of fiat in a 
central decisionmaker is the essential characteristic of its governance.122 
Public corporations raise capital from widely dispersed or atomized 
shareholders.123 Information asymmetry coupled with a diversity of 
perspectives presents difficulties for collective rationality and collective 
action. Collective action problems could be surmounted through 
coordination, but coordination generally is impractical to achieve in the 
context of widely dispersed ownership.124 In publicly traded firms, it is only 
desirable for shareholders to attempt to discipline managers when it 
becomes collectively desirable to do so because the collective benefits 
exceed the costs.125 Participation as a social good, jointly produced by a 
corporation and its shareholders, surfaces as a difficult proposition because 
of “the incommensurability and incomplete communicability of human 
wants and values.”126 
A further problem with realizing shareholders’ “common” interests is 
the existence of significant private, or individual, interests.127 For example, 
Bebchuk contends management may often trade shareholder premia in 
exchange for personal benefits that they can obtain by ending their filibuster 
against a takeover.128 There is little reason to presume that shareholders, 
given the power to more fully participate in corporate decisions, would act 
differently. Like many shareholder primacists, McConvill overlooks the 
possibility that investors with “significant private interests” and sufficient 
incentives might “use any incremental power conferred upon them to 
pursue those interests to the detriment of shareholders as a class.”129 
Enlarged shareholder power can be transformed into a vehicle to 
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subordinate overall shareholder material welfare, as some shareholders 
increase their participation in order to secure private benefits. This 
quandary is sharpened in the presence of institutional investors driven by a 
supposed happiness objective. Participation yields private benefits which 
are not shared equally by all shareholders. This outcome may be the 
opposite of what McConvill predicts.130 
The prospect of receiving a disproportionate share of returns (either 
material or psychological) provides an incentive for shareholders to 
overcome collective action problems through rent-seeking, which can take a 
financial or non-financial shape.131 Disparate interests require a mediating 
structure that is capable of adjudicating among the potentially endless 
varieties of shareholder interests. McConvill simply ignores coordination 
issues and the existing role of directors in conciliating the conflicting 
interests of shareholders.132 His scaffold, properly juxtaposed against the 
probability that selfish-motives can be transmuted into private benefits and 
collective costs, seems conspicuously fragile. 
C. THE COSTS OF MCCONVILL’S PROGRAM 
McConvill asserts that participation ought to be encouraged and 
accommodated because it makes people happy.133 However, discovering the 
amount of participation that increases happiness the most is an optimizing 
problem, not a maximizing problem. More participation, therefore, is not 
necessarily better. Participation by shareholders or others is costly in many 
ways. It is unclear how McConvill would evaluate the happiness of 
different groups of shareholders. Compounding this issue are the costs of 
coordinating participation incurred by the investors and the firm itself. For 
example, participation by individual shareholders with divergent interests 
imposes costs on, and reduces the happiness of, the community of 
shareholders. Since these costs accumulate as the amount of participation 
increases, it stands to reason that, beyond some point at least, it makes 
sense to stop promoting it. 
By way of example, imagine a very simple company, Widgets 
Transnational, with only two investors, person A and person B. Each 
investor has a utility function that determines how happy she is with her 
life. Assume A’s and B’s happiness is affected by only a few things, 
including participation. Then: 
UA = f[WealthA (LaborA, InvestmentsA (PA, PB)), HealthA, PA, PB]; and 
UB = f[WealthB (LaborB, InvestmentsB (PA, PB)), HealthB, PA, PB], 
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where U = utility, P = participation, and A’s and B’s participation agendas 
may differ. While participating in their own life experiences could be a 
positive factor for both A and B, it is not the only thing that promotes their 
respective happiness. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of each 
one’s participation are not fully internalized. A’s utility is a function of her 
own wealth, health, participation, and of B’s participation. A is happier 
when she is wealthier, healthier, and can participate more. A may or may 
not be happier due to B’s participation, but it could affect her in some direct 
way (positively or negatively). More importantly, A’s wealth is a function 
of her own labor and investments. Her investment returns are a function of 
her participation and the participation of B. Because participation is costly, 
any participation by A or B in A’s investments may be negatively related to 
A’s wealth, and thus, to her happiness.134 So, B’s participation affects A’s 
happiness both directly, in whatever way A feels about B’s participation, 
and indirectly by reducing the value of A’s wealth (which reduces her 
happiness). 
A related problem is that participation invites rent-seeking. Under a 
participatory scheme, shareholders and managers may strategically 
withhold information from one another.135 There is also the risk that making 
divergent stakeholders privy to insider information leads to leaks of 
valuable private information to the workforce, competitors, or the public at 
large.136 Such leaks can lower profits due to higher wages and strategic 
responses from competitors.137 Also, activist shareholders can provoke 
companies to pay them to stop participating or to stop leaking 
information.138 This raises the costs of doing business and139 may also 
discourage stakeholders from transmitting information among 
themselves.140 This, of course, has a negative feedback effect on other 
investors who invest solely for profit (most of them). It seems unlikely that 
McConvill would support this sort of extortive behavior, which is closely 
tied to his program.141 
Acknowledging that most publicly traded corporations have thousands 
more investors than the simple company, it is likely that the overall 
transaction and coordination costs derived from the participation of large 
numbers of shareholders, as well as the rent-seeking encouraged thereby, 
reduce the happiness benefits that accrue to the community of shareholders. 
Shareholder participation is likely to be expensive to, among others, the 
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participating investor, other investors, and the companies that allow 
participation.142 
Investors as a class are made up of small- and medium-sized individual 
investors, public employee pension funds, unions, and others, all with 
differing time horizons, objectives and conceptions of happiness. 
Reconfiguring the purchase of stock as well as corporate governance to 
satisfy McConvill’s stated preference for participatory activities would 
require the investment of scarce economic resources, including time, by 
shareholders and shareholder groups (mutual funds, unions, and pension 
funds) to gather information, deliberate and convey their views on corporate 
issues to management.143 This would reduce the amount of time that they 
could spend on alternative participatory or nonparticipatory activities. As a 
rule, “shareholders lack incentives to gather the information necessary to 
actively participate in decisionmaking. A rational shareholder will expend 
the effort necessary to make informed decisions only if the expected 
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.”144 McConvill’s approach 
necessarily requires interpersonal utility comparisons and mandates the 
weighing of the happiness benefits against the costs of human suffering that 
necessarily accompany the implementation of this scheme. His failure to 
address this fact is a significant weakness in his theory. 
Our intuition also suggests greater shareholder participation would 
negatively affect corporate performance. If true, this refutes McConvill’s 
claim that shareholder wealth maximization remains unaffected.145 
McConvill argues investment of scarce economic/psychological resources 
by shareholders would not hinder economic returns, because increasing 
shareholder power emerges within a sustainable (material) wealth-
maximization framework, within which shareholders (possibly risking 
happiness-inducing participatory experiences) decline to interfere unduly 
with the default rule of managerial/directorial authority.146 Nonetheless, he 
contends this development fashions an appealing proposition that allows 
shareholders, “to have their cake, and help bake it too.”147 That is, they gain 
the psychological benefits of participation while retaining all of the 
expected material benefits that are derived from managerial/directorial fiat 
and the wealth maximization norm. This claim ignores the direct costs to 
shareholders, as well as the external costs of increased shareholder 
participation that are borne by the corporations who endure it. These costs 
are ultimately passed on to the participatory investor as well as all of the 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Shareholder participation is likely to be costly for the economy at large as well as other 
institutions. See id. 
 143. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 144. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 623. 
 145. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1058–59. 
 146. Id. at 1053. 
 147. Id. 
62 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
other shareholders of the corporation, necessarily, therefore, reducing their 
respective material gains. 
There are other problems with McConvill’s assertion that increased 
shareholder participation does not affect the bottom line. Potential creditors 
will not lend to firms with less accountable managers without compensation 
for the risks posed by the lack of accountability.148 Investors are provided 
governance arrangements, and these arrangements are rolled into the price 
of the stock. If the arrangements are stacked against investors, the stock 
price will be discounted. Using governance terms preferred by investors 
reduces the firm’s cost of capital by attracting a higher price for the 
securities.149 In the face of participation, the cost of capital rises due to less 
favorable borrowing terms, and earnings fall. Another cost of participation 
is eternal surveillance. This requires the acquisition and digestion of 
information by dispersed and diverse individuals, which imposes costs on 
either participants or shareholders, and consequently reduces shareholder 
welfare.150 Given the apparent unsupportability of McConvill’s proposition, 
it seems unlikely that there is any place in corporate governance for 
increased shareholder power, if it does not aim to strengthen the bottom 
line, but instead aims at enhancing something else. 
D. OTHER DIFFICULTIES 
Other difficulties remain. First, McConvill’s analysis lacks clarity with 
respect to what constitutes an appropriate conception of happiness. Second, 
he fails to untangle the impact of human choice and intent for purposes of 
ascertaining the goal associated with a given stock purchase. Finally, 
McConvill neglects to describe how one determines the constitutive 
components of an experiential good as opposed to a material one. 
1. What Is (Or Should Be) “Happiness”? 
In his pallid attempt to address what happiness consists of, McConvill 
asserts, “[i]n the normal scheme of things, law should be evaluated by one 
criterion: its capacity to promote human well-being, or ‘happiness.’”151 He 
contributes to the vagueness of this enterprise152 by relying, ostensibly, on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. McConvill claims that Aristotle favors 
happiness as a first principle that consists of virtuous activities.153 This 
approach intimates that morality dictates that happiness is the primary 
objective of humans and leads to the conclusion that only virtuous activities 
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have the capacity to produce happiness. Happiness-desiring humans, 
therefore, ought to prefer virtuous activities to less virtuous ones. Later, 
however, McConvill invokes a largely hedonic conception of utilitarianism: 
happiness consists of obtaining more pleasure with the absence of pain, 
where human satisfaction is tied to whatever goals an individual sets 
forward.154 This statement suggests that happiness-desiring humans should 
maximize pleasure constrained only by the possible infliction of pain, 
regardless of virtuousness. McConvill asserts that though “individuals live 
their lives in a variety of different ways, these different pursuits have a 
common goal: the fulfillment of happiness. Each of us engages in different 
types of ‘need expression’, but our central or overriding need is to be 
happy.”155 He provides little reason why Americans committed to 
autonomy, or shareholders in particular, would favor his understanding 
rather than Mill’s opinion that “happiness cannot result from seeking 
pleasure as an end in itself, but must result from the pursuit of higher 
goals.”156 McConvill fails to explain, however, whether he is driven by the 
necessity of finding and encouraging virtuous activities, or energized by 
utilitarianism as a wide-ranging theory that could include hedonic or other 
conceptions. 
Second, McConvill insists the goals associated with the purchase of 
stock are defined exclusively by human choice and intent.157 He asserts that 
individuals actually choose to structure their lives to pursue material goods 
when what they really should be doing is focusing their attention on 
building relational ones.158 Bafflingly, he states that human choice/intent 
can transmute a material good into a relational one, while he simultaneously 
reprimands corporations that offer, and shareholders who accept, the 
“choice” of purchasing stock that primarily provides material benefits. 
McConvill’s assertion that shareholders’ “true” interests (happiness-
producing activities) are missing in this contractual exchange model only 
contributes to this puzzle. McConvill’s psychonomics are disjunctive, 
because if shareholders do not know their own interests, why will they have 
reason to choose participatory goods as an alternative to material ones, even 
assuming participatory goods are available? 
Thirdly, McConvill focuses on the importance of experiential purchases 
as a key to happiness. He fails, however, to delineate a theory that describes 
clearly what constitutes an experiential as opposed to a material purchase. 
Whether a purchase is experiential or material “depends on the intention of 
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the purchaser.”159 A purchase is experiential when the purchaser has the 
primary intention of acquiring a life experience through her purchase.160 A 
particular purchase could be defined as an experiential activity by one 
person and as a material possession by another.161 There is no way of 
knowing ex ante which purchases by which individuals will constitute an 
experiential purchase because we have no way of discerning intention until 
intention occurs. One’s intention may remain fluid and can change ex post. 
A good acquired for one purpose can metamorphose into a good that 
achieves another. The acquisition of shares of stock could be primarily a 
material purchase animated by profits, but that does not rule out utilizing 
the shares as an experiential purchase later.162 
Finally, McConvill does not explain why people will choose to take 
advantage of experiential/participatory goods if they are made available. He 
constructs his case for greater participation by relying (at least partially) on 
studies authored by Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer,163 which insinuate that 
people are dissatisfied with passive activities, and become happier as a 
result of participation. However, an additional study authored by Frey, 
Benesch & Stutzer suggests that when additional participatory activities are 
made available, humans generally fail to take advantage of them.164 Why 
should we expect human behavior to be any different when additional 
experiential goods such as shareholder participation are made available 
when there is little evidence that humans take advantage of existing 
participatory activities? There are two far more persuasive alternative 
conclusions. First, in keeping with the premise that people know their own 
interests, participation in such activities simply yields less happiness than 
McConvill claims. Or possibly, putatively passive activities such as 
television-watching actually do contribute to participation and civic 
engagement in the United States, and constitute a break from more directly 
participatory activities.165 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
McConvill’s shareholder participation framework relies on 
psychonomics.166 Apparently, psychonomics heralds a certain kind of 
expert, a superior one. This new mode of expert, like former varieties, 
appears to be predisposed to disapprove of allowing the individual to make 
unfettered choices in the marketplace.167 As Peart and Levy illustrate: 
As long as the expert maintains that he possesses insight into the sorts of 
preferences people “should” possess—if they only knew better—he must 
also accept, and may perhaps even demand, responsibility for directing 
those preferences until the subjects gain the sort of sophistication that he 
enjoys.168 
It is possible that the ability of shareholders, boards and firms to reason, 
make judgments, and reach contractual agreements that empower directors 
and not shareholders, is not to be trusted unless directed by experts.169 It is 
equally possible, but seemingly unlikely, that classical economists erred by 
believing that people make choices in response to incentives.170 If the 
judgment of shareholders cannot be trusted, and if shareholders do not 
respond adequately to incentives, then it is possible to posit the necessity of 
transformative intervention by experts to ensure the achievement of a 
certain level of human status and happiness.171 This argument, to the extent 
and in the manner in which McConvill presents it, is unconvincing. 
McConvill’s program commends participation leading to happiness, but 
cannot avoid an empty circularity. He offers the following conclusion: 
“Shareholder participation should be the end-game, recognising the direct 
benefits to shareholders through treating their shares as an experiential 
purchase.”172 If McConvill simply means that shareholders and firms should 
adopt his preferences for participatory, relational and experiential happiness 
as a possibility among a myriad others, it might be understandable. If, on 
the other hand, he wishes to convert his preferences into a universal ideal, it 
is less so, given the multiple problems with his theory’s outcome. 
McConvill’s approach seems to be a set of preferences just like any other 
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set. As preferences, they could “be part of any welfarist approach, but their 
weight and importance would be dramatically smaller than if they were 
believed to be universal ideals.”173 
Individuals and institutions that seize upon McConvill’s thesis as a 
socially desirable approach to change the world will be disappointed. His 
attempt at universalization collapses into welfarism, wherein the proper 
locus of rational choice remains, as the price system implies, the self-
interested individual. Hirschman shows, 
Two essential elements appear to characterize interest-propelled action: 
self-centredness [sic], that is, predominant attention of the actor to the 
consequences of any contemplated action for himself; and rational 
calculation, that is, a systematic attempt at evaluating prospective costs, 
benefits, satisfactions, and the like.174 
In McConvill’s world, by contrast, selfish motives are employed for 
two purposes: material gain and the opportunity to obtain relational goods 
providing experiential and happiness benefits to investors. McConvill 
constructs a system that mimics the price system but with a different metric 
of utility: experiential welfare instead of material wealth. Even if 
shareholders prefer participatory goods to material ones, McConvill fails to 
specify why they must have an opportunity to purchase an increased array 
of participatory goods as a constitutive component of corporate governance 
when alternative, highly participatory frameworks are already available. 
Investors who crave participatory experiences can choose from a rich stew 
of alternative activities that are readily available in both the profit and non-
profit sectors. Investors who seek profits plus control can enjoy 
partnerships, LLC’s and LLP’s, as well sole proprietorships. 
Additionally, McConvill appears to ignore the costs of implementing 
his program and the probable interest divergence among shareholders; these 
things taken together undermine his proposal. Despite its short-comings,175 
social science suggests that when humans act as citizens, “politicians, 
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managers, academics, professionals, . . . or factory workers, [they do so as] 
resourceful, evaluative maximizers” who respond creatively to optimize the 
opportunities the environment presents.176 It is doubtful that McConvill’s 
analysis has extended this research to investors in particularly useful ways. 
John Dewey saw “the epochal developments of evolutionary biology as 
a model for immediate, constant, revolutionary social change,”177 creating a 
new society comprised of new, non-conforming individuals.178 This new 
society would be led by individuals who were enthralled by the new 
possibilities associated with collaborative and participatory activities. 
Professor Shannon shows that Dewey’s metaphor of cellular growth as an 
alternative to stasis suggests not evolution so much as cancer.179 As 
Shannon shows, this move in the hands of Dewey’s intellectual heirs led not 
to order but to chaos.180 McConvill formulates a “new normality,” wherein 
participation issues forth as a fresh effort to expand human frontiers, 
enabling investors to continuously reinterpret relational experiences while 
liberating their personal strengths and virtues from confining constraints 
imposed by corporate hierarchs. In turn, this generates positive emotions for 
shareholders181 and defies the status quo.182 Not unlike Dewey’s aspiration, 
McConvill creates a new corporate governance model that offers the give-
and-take of participation as an effort to deepen the significance and 
satisfaction of human interaction. This evolutionary move, unconstrained 
by fiduciary duties, has no defined stopping point, and it appears to 
flounder. This is because social organisms populated by individuals and 
groups (including investors and fellow contractors) work to maintain 
existing structures or alternatively decide to exit the firm based on the 
prudential and normative assessments of their own interests. McConvill’s 
shareholder happiness initiative is ephemeral. Instead of augmenting 
happiness, it is more likely to prove susceptible to infection in the form of 
rent-seeking, additional costs, and less material wealth. In light of this 
critique, the appropriate default rule for shareholder participation rights, as 
a general matter, is not to have any beyond the limits that the director 
primacy model prescribes. Properly understood, McConvill’s contention 
that a strong case can be made for empowering shareholders as an end in 
itself is Panglossian. 
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